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 This project is planned to analyze the congruence between the theoretical aspect 
and legislative base of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense procurement system and their 
implementation with the present practices. This will help the proper understanding of 
how the system works and if it could better serve the national security needs. The project 
analyzes existing acquisition practices and proposes recommendations for improving key 
acquisition processes and policies. In addition, the project presents analysis of the 
procurement system as organizational structure within the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense 
with its existing interconnections and activities. The recommendations for possible 
improvements consider the existing constraints and barriers that originate from acting 
legislation, organizational design, or applied practices. 
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The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria is a complex organization 
that ensures the political command and civilian control over the Armed Forces of the 
state. It translates the policy of the Government from the National Assembly through the 
Council of Ministers towards the military structures responsible for the national security 
of Bulgaria.  
The Minister of Defense is directly responsible for conducting the government 
policy in the Armed Forces. Under his control are defense planning, personnel and social 
policy, training, health and planning activities, state-owned military property 
maintenance and management, and budget allocation for the Ministry of Defense (MoD). 
The Minister of Defense is the only legitimate representative of the Ministry in dealing 
with third parties as the Government, officials, political, non-political or trade 
organizations and institutions, and contracting procedures. He controls directly the 
officers’ staff policy in the Armed Forces.1 
The General Staff is the main body that provides the strategic management of the 
Bulgarian Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime and the implementation of the tasks 
laid down in all national security and defense documents. It works under the command 
and direct control of the Minister of Defense.  
All the civilian, trade and contracting legislations of the state are fully applicable 
in the structures of the Armed Forces. Their implementation is supported with detailed 
explanatory instructions, regulatory acts, or other documents in the form of orders of the 
Ministry of Defense. 
In such an environment the system for procurement of armament, ammunitions, 
specialized military equipment, support materiel, spare parts and other supplies, could not 
be localized in a particular structure. As far as the requests for acquisition or the input 
                                                 
1 White Paper on Defense, adopted with decision of the Council of Ministers on April 04, 2002. 
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information is provided by the planning organizations of all the different armed forces, 
(based on the approved annual plans for training, exercising, deployment and other 
activities), the system should deal directly with military formations and units from all the 
levels of the military organization. In addition, the input information should be verified 
with the existing standards and with the applied measures for military security, which are 
activities delegated to different agencies under military control.  
On the other side the process of marketing, negotiating and contracting widely 
involves interactions with organizations outside the Ministry of Defense. The Minister of 
Defense, as the only legitimate representative authorized to sign all the contracts in the 
name of the Ministry, is widely involved in the procurement system too.  
In this situation proper understanding of the processes, the internal and external 
connections, and the legislative base for organizing the managing of the procurement 
system is highly advisable.  
In addition, the analysis for possible improvements of the system is highly 
recommended in order to increase the efficiency of the implied practices. 
 
B. PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT 
 
 This project analyses the theoretical and legislative base for establishing and 
functioning of procurement system in the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of 
Bulgaria. It will analyze the present practices and their congruence with the theoretical 
base and the national security interests from the MoD perspective. In addition, the project 
will analyze some key areas for possible improvements of the system in order to obtain 
its higher efficiency. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
• What is the congruence between the theoretical and the legislative bases for 
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developing the procurement system of the Ministry of Defense and the present 
practices applied with its functioning? 
 
2. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
• Where is the position of the procurement system in the structures of the 
Ministry of Defense and the other military organizations? 
• Which are the theoretical and the legislative bases for the procurement system 
functioning? 
• What is the structure of the planning process in connection with the 
procurement system? 
• Which are the strengths and the weaknesses of the system? 
• Which are the key areas for improvements? 
• Which are the additional questions that should be analyzed further? 
 
D. SCOPE OF THE PROJECT 
 
This project is focused on the procurement system theory and practices from the 
Ministry of Defense perspective. It does not intend to discuss the problems from the 
request-makers and from the consumers’ points of view. In addition, the analysis in the 
project is limited to the implementation of the procurement system in regards of the Air 
Force only. The processes in connection with the other types of armed forces have no 
significant differences. In addition, the procured equipment for the Air Force is costly 
and has high variety of foreign manufacturers, nomenclatures, standards, security and 
safety requirements, and warranty procedures. 
The project is not focused on the applied command and control practices in the 
Ministry of Defense and the existing procurement system, or their efficiency and 
congruence, as well as on problems connected with equipment and communication 
problems. 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT 
 
This project is divided into four subsequent chapters. 
Chapter II – The Procurement System in Theory provides a review on the MoD 
structure and the procurement system allocation, and discusses the legislative base and 
the applied objectives and principles. It also provides analysis of the process of 
procurement planning and some objective constraints in the system. 
Chapter III – The Procurement System in Practice discusses the process of 
acquisition, the scope of responsibilities, the congruence with the applied theory, and the 
effectiveness of the system. 
Chapter IV – Key Areas for Possible Improvements presents analysis of some 
possible improvements, together with the existing constraints against improvements and 
ways for motivation towards changes. 
Chapter V – Conclusions provides assessment of the efficiency of the system, 





II. THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM IN THEORY 
 
A. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
1. AUTHORITIES  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and the acting laws stipulate the 
powers of the National Assembly, the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers, 
the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the General Staff in managing defense. 
Common knowledge of the division of authorities is proper for better understanding of 
the bureaucratic nature of the organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense. All the 
activities, authorities, administrative relations, and processes are strictly defined with the 
acting laws, implemented rules, and internally issued instructions, orders, and Codes, 
empowered by the Minister of Defense. 
In Article 34 the Defense Act states that the Minister of Defense manages, 
coordinates, controls and is responsible for the implementation of the government policy 
into the Ministry of Defense and into the Armed Forces.2 The same article establishes that 
the Minister of Defense, his deputies, and the other members of the Political Cabinet are 
civilians. All the authorities of the Minister of Defense are contained in Articles 35, 36, 
and 37 of the Defense Act.3 In such a way the Defense Act ensures the total civilian 
control over all the activities into the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces.  
The organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense is based on The Structural 
Code.4 It is a compilation of the acting legislative papers that address all the main 
activities in the Ministry of Defense as a public, political, and military organization. The 
Structural Code reflects the necessity for fulfillment of the main short-term and mid-term 
goals of the Government policy for becoming a NATO member and the Armed Force’s 
modernization plans. It consists of all the rules for managing and administrating the 
organizational elements. 
                                                 
2 Defense Act, published in State Paper # 112 / December 27, 1995. 
3 Defense Act, published in State Paper # 112 / December 27, 1995. 
4 Structural Code, published in State Paper # 72 / August 13, 1999. 
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The administrative reform has placed strict requirements to the structure of the 
administration that led to a significant downsizing of the MoD personnel. As a result by 
January 1, 2002 the organizational structures, the administrative units, and the secondary 
budget holders amount less than 7400 people and this figure will be reduced further.5 
There are many stakeholders interested in the Ministry of Defense and the Armed 
Forces management, due to the large potential of power focused in the military 
organization and its great importance for the national security of the state. All the 
political players and organizations in the state are highly interested to obtain strong 
influence into the military structures. In order to prevent the misuse of the military power 
the Constitution of the state delegates authorities to manage the military organizations 
only to the Government institutions with the highest rank as the National Assembly, the 
President, and the Council of Ministers. In addition, the decision for the use of force is 
not in the prerogatives of the military commanders. The strong civilian control has to 
prevent additionally internal or external preparations or direct misuse of force. In this 
case the bureaucratic character of the organization with strictly defined rules, roles, and 
responsibilities is highly recommended and designed purposefully. The clear hierarchy of 
authority in the highly centralized structure of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed 
Forces is to prevent any higher level of uncertainty due to an unstable environment or 
unacceptable activities of the stakeholders.  
 
2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria accommodates different 
directorates, agencies, services and other elements in connection with: 
• Political command and control; 
• Military command and control; 
• Financial resources command and control; 
• Legal activities; 
                                                 
5 White Paper on Defense, adopted with decision of the Council of Ministers on April 04, 2002. 
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• Civilian control; 
• Security and Military Intelligence; 
• Military education. 
In accordance with their purpose, the administrative units of the Ministry of 
Defense are integrated into general or specialized administration. Figure 1 presents the 
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Figure 1: Organizational structure of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense. 
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administrative functioning and the organizational link between the Political Cabinet and 
the administrative units. 
The General Staff is the main body that provides the strategic management of the 
Bulgarian Armed Forces in peace and wartime and the implementation of the tasks laid 
down in all national security and defense documents. The Chief of General Staff manages 
it and reports directly to the Minister of Defense. The General Staff is separated 
structurally from the Ministry of Defense in order to achieve relative independence in its 
functioning under the civilian control of the Ministry of Defense. The structure of the 
General Staff ensures the military command and control of the Armed Forces in support 
of the Chief of General Staff functions.  
The structure of the General Staff and other headquarters in the Bulgarian Armed 
Forces is in line with the unified staff structure adopted by NATO member states.6 
 
3. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
The Administration Act7, the Structural Code, and the acting instructions define 
all the tasks and interactions throughout the Ministry of Defense as an organization. Any 
interdependence and common activities among different parts of the organizations are 
solved throughout the centralized channels of authority. And still the routine technology 
of the decision taking process, the paper preparation, orders issuance and their 
endorsement involves the participation of most of the main elements of the Ministry of 
Defense.  
In addition, the flow of information uses only vertical channels. No official 
information passes among the elements of the organization without endorsement of a 
common level of command.  
                                                 
6 White Paper on Defense, adopted with decision of the Council of Ministers on April 04, 2002. 
7 Administration Act, published in State paper # 130 / October 05, 1998. 
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According to the definition of James Thompson, quoted by Richard Daft,8 there is 
a high level of pooled interdependence in the MoD organization where work does not 
flow horizontally among different parts of the system.  
Burns and Stalker, quoted by Richard Daft, characterize such an organization as 
highly mechanistic.9 Some of the problems in such a design are low speed of 
informational flow, difficult interactions, and blurred responsibilities in interdependence. 
But adopting such a structure is another way to decrease the existing organizational 
uncertainty, which is one of the main goals of bureaucratic organizations as the Ministry 
of Defense. 
In addition, such a structure is intentionally designed in order to ensure the 
possibility for overall control on the activities and visibility of the processes on account 
of the specific importance of the taken decisions for the national security of the state.  
 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM 
 
1. STAGES OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
 
The process of acquisition could be divided into three main stages in accordance 








                                                 
8 Richard Daft, “Organization – Theory and Design”, Cincinnati, Ohio: South Western College, Publishing, 
1998, 6th edition, p. 88. 
9 Richard Daft, “Organization – Theory and Design”, Cincinnati, Ohio: South Western College, Publishing, 
















Figure 2: Three main stages in acquisition process. 
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The first stage – Acquisition planning, involves different logistics planning units 
throughout the Armed Forces’ structures and the General Staff. All of them are under 
General Staff command and are not assigned as detached parts of the procurement 
system. 
The planning process is a core function of the logistics planning units under the 
control of directly involved command. There are no officially assigned responsibilities to 
those units in connection with the procurement system, only with the planning procedure. 
The second stage – Contracting activities, includes specific procedures assigned 
to the procurement system. It consists of standards verification, security measures and 
procedure confirmation, marketing, competition assignment, negotiating, and contracting.  
Those procedures are based on the Public Procurement Act10 that is interpreted 
additionally in Instruction of the Minister of Defense.11  
The Procurement Management Directorate is part of the Ministry of Defense 
organizational structure (see Figure 1) and brings the responsibilities for the overall 
management of those procedures, working with different organizations and institutions in 
and outside the Ministry of Defense. 
As far as the Minister of Defense is the only legal and officially authorized 
representative of the Ministry of Defense12, at this stage the Procurement Management 
Directorate works for him to prepare the contracts and to organize their signing. 
The third stage – Contracts fulfillment, includes procedures for contracts 
fulfillment control, products deliveries control, warranty procedures fulfillment, 
replacements, and claims. The responsibilities for those activities are not assigned 
specifically to any part of the procurement system with particular order, paper, or act. As 
part in the contracts the Minister of Defense should be responsible for their fulfillment 
but he has no capabilities to manage such responsibilities. As organizational element that 
prepares the contracts the Procurement Management Directorate brings the 
                                                 
10 Public Procurement Act, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
11 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Defense, issued on 
October 10, 2001. 
12 Defense Act, published in State Paper # 112 / December 27, 1995.  
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responsibilities for those procedures and works with different agencies assigned to the 
Ministry of Defense and authorized to work with the Customs, as trade organizations, or 
with delivery companies. 
 
2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
Figure 3 presents all the elements from the Ministry of Defense and the General 
Staff that are involved into the procurement system during different stages. 
The Armed Forces are main customers for the procurement system. They report to 
the Headquarters corresponding to their service. In so far as the Headquarters are 
responsible for the consolidated requests for acquisitions, they could be viewed as the 
first level of the procurement system. The connected activities for the consolidated 
requests’ preparation are similar for all the Armed Forces’ Headquarters.  
The Command for Material and Technical Support (and Medical Services) is the 
next level of the procurement system. It is included into J4 - Operations Division of the 
General Staff structure and is responsible for the common acquisition planning process.  
Both levels include military formations under the General Staff overall command. 
They are not assigned parts of the procurement system but still they provide the resource 
information for the system and take part during the first stage of the acquisition process.  
The Procurement Management Directorate is the main body of the procurement 
system that works with different military structures, structural parts of the Ministry of 
Defense and the General Staff, civilian organizations, agencies, and institutions, in the 
name of the Ministry of Defense. In this case the positioning of the Procurement 
Management Directorate into the Ministry of Defense organizational structure is 
appropriate.  
A civilian Director heads the Directorate and reports to the assigned Deputy 
Ministers. The Director is responsible for the administrative management of his 
Directorate and of the procurement system. To influence other agents into the Ministry of 






















The Procurement Management Directorate is divided structurally on departments 
in accordance with the assigned products for acquisition. It is to support the established 
contacts and practices with the potential manufacturers, companies, or intermediary 
deliverers, but there is no common database for products’ availability and channels for 
their acquisition. Every different department works separately and uses its own points of 
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Figure 3: Organizational structure of the procurement system. 
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contacts. The information is not organized in common database that could be used 
throughout the Directorate. 
The Procurement Management Directorate is responsible for management of the 
procurement system during the second and the third stage of the acquisition process.  
The procedures included into the second stage – contracting activities (see Figure 
2) involve different structural parts of the Ministry of Defense that are structurally 
independent from each other.  
The Standardization, Codification and Verification Agency that is assigned to the 
Defense Policy and Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (see Figure 3) should 
confirm the correspondence with standards for the requested products before the 
beginning of marketing procedures. The Director of the Procurement Management 
Directorate requests such verification through formal channels of authorities for all the 
products planned for acquisition. Furthermore the agency is responsible for products’ 
codification and quality control of the acquired products in accordance with the 
“Regulations for providing and managing the quality”13.  
The Security-Military Police and Military Counterintelligence Service is an 
independent part of the Ministry of Defense and reports directly to the Minister of 
Defense (see Figures 1 and 3). The Procurement Management Directorate should obtain 
confirmation for the significance of every acquired product for the national security of 
the state in connection with assigning of different type of contracting procedure for 
acquisition (in accordance with the implementation of Public Procurement Act14 and 
Instruction of the Minister of Defense15). The director of the directorate requests such a 
confirmation with formal letter to the Chief of the Service for every product or group of 
products included in a separate marketing procedure. Both the request and the 
confirmation use the vertical channel of communication and usually could be done for no 
less than five to ten days.   
                                                 
13 Regulation for providing and managing the quality of military and special products in the Ministry of 
Defense and the Bulgarian Army, issued in 2001. 
14 Public Procurement Act, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
15 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Defense, issued on 
October 10, 2001. 
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The Legal Activities Directorate takes part in the procurement system throughout 
competition assignment and contracting procedures. The assigned representative of the 
directorate is responsible for justification of the candidate contractors and the prepared 
contract. The assignment is based on particular order of the Minister of Defense for every 
single procedure for contracting. There are no particular representatives assigned 
permanently to work with the Procurement Management Directorate. Furthermore the 
Legal Activities Directorate deals with all the in-court solutions of any contracts’ 
fulfillment problems. 
Budget Planning and Management Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (see 
Figures 1 and 3) is responsible for all payments on the contracts. A representative of the 
directorate takes part in the assigned board for assessment of the candidates for 
contracting during the competition assignment procedure. The Procurement Management 
Directorate supports limited budget for communicational and office expenditures only. 
Every year the Minister of Defense assigns fields of responsibilities to his four 
Deputy Ministers with a special order. Those responsibilities include administering of 
different parts of the Ministry of Defense, particular processes, or essential activities. The 
assigned Deputy Minister could supervise important procedures for acquisition or costly 
contracts processing but usually he has no specific responsibilities in connection with the 
procurement system.  
 
3. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
The only continuous part of the procurement system is the Procurement 
Management Directorate. All the other elements are involved in different procedures in 
connection with the process of acquisition. Nonetheless, the influence of the other system 
participants could be vital for management of the system.  
As part of the Ministry of Defense, the procurement system has the same 
stakeholders as the military organization itself. The government establishes particular 
policy that the Minister of Defense implements throughout its structure and the Armed 
Forces. As far as the logistics supplies and support are vital for all the Armed Forces, the 
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proper management of the procurement system is essential for the national security of the 
state. Furthermore the biggest part of the military budget is spent for support of the 
troops. Therefore an efficient procurement system could result in significant savings. 
Changes after the collapse of the USSR led to sharp shrinkage of the military 
market. In addition, a lot of new players are trying to find their place in the market. The 
old channels for military supplies do not work anymore. All of this shapes the immense 
interest towards the market of military productions. The higher level of market 
uncertainty forces the manufacturers and suppliers to adopt aggressive tactics for market 
penetration.16 
In addition, the aging armament, combat systems and fleet of the Bulgarian 
Armed Forces bring closer and closer the time for total replacement and rearmament with 
newer weapons.  
The prospective of NATO membership additionally forces the Ministry of 
Defense to look for opportunities to acquire new weapons and armament compatible with 
the NATO standards. 
All of this results in enormous pressure from the existing suppliers of military 
equipment against the Ministry of Defense that has reflected in the elements of the 
procurement system. The environment in which the system works is highly unstable with 
high levels of uncertainty. In order to reduce the uncertainty, the adopted policy forces 
strict control over every single step of the acquisition processes, total compliance with 
existing acts, papers, and rules, and hard practices for assessment of every potential 
contractor.  
In addition, as part of the Ministry of Defense, the Procurement Management 
Directorate adopts the highly centralized command, clear hierarchy of authority and strict 
adherence of all the existing rules, acts, instructions and other papers. The only applied 
channels of communications are vertical.  
Due to the wide differentiation and specialization of military equipment, the 
departments of the Procurement Management Directorate and the other procurement 
                                                 
16  Markusen and Costigan editors, “Arming the Future”, Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York, 
1999. 
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system elements are highly independent and separated from each other. All the main 
tasks and procedures are clearly defined in advance.  
In accordance with Burns and Stalker, quoted by Richard Daft, the procurement 
system could be classified as a highly mechanistic organizational structure.17 The 
Procurement Management Directorate shares the same characteristic. The strengths of 
such organizations are the strict compliance with all relevant rules, highly developed 
specialization, and low risks in decision taking processes. But in such an organization 
there are no conditions for teamwork, innovations, horizontal interconnections, internal 
links and interdependence, or interchangeability. The only possible way of processing is 
through the vertical channels of authority. In addition, the responsibilities are not clearly 
defined throughout the system that could lead to significant time delays and passiveness 
of the involved personnel.  
The existing differentiation of departments and variety of products reduce the 
possibility for creation and support of common database of acting manufacturers, 
suppliers, and channels for deliveries.  
The informal communications with other players in the system are unacceptable, 
are not tolerated, and not implied. The formal, vertical channels of information flow 
increase significantly the time for processing information and lead to delays.  
Dealing with numerous outside organizations, agents, and other players brings a 
lot of uncertainty in the Procurement Management Directorate management and actions. 
All the contracting procedures differ from each other, which brings a high level of variety 
into the working processes for all the departments of the Directorate. The development of 
universally designed contract applicable to all the procedures is impossible. That brings a 
lot of risk during the contracts’ preparation and their fulfillment. But still there are a lot 
of recommendations that could be applied to the process of contracting, based on existing 
better practices, or relevant legislation.  
                                                 
17 Richard Daft, “Organization – Theory and Design”, Cincinnati, Ohio: South Western College, 
Publishing, 1998, 6th edition, p. 58. 
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The existing differences among the contract procedures mean little ability to 
analyze the processes.18 This, along with the high variety of processes defines the 
technology of the procurement system as engineering one. Such a technology needs high 
levels of creativity, openness of the system, teamwork, and adaptable organization, which 
is impossible in bureaucratic, highly mechanistic organization. This is a serious 
disconnect between the designed organization and the applied technology. But the high 
level of uncertainty and immense cost of risk acceptance impose such a structure.  
In order to cope with the variety of the system, the personnel in the Procurement 
Management Directorate should have significant experience, economic background or 
proper education. In addition, the high level of pressure and risk makes the work in such 
conditions unattractive. There are no additional incentives to compensate for the 
unattractiveness of the system. 
Every single part of the procurement system could influence significantly the 
effectiveness of the system. The channels of information flow are vertical and there are 
no horizontal connections or work flow. In accordance with James Thompson, quoted by 
Richard Daft, there is a strongly pooled interdependence in the procurement system.19 
This could lead to significant delays of the information flow and therefore to increase a 
risk of procedures failure.  
According to Nadler and Tushman we have equifinality if “different system 
configurations can lead to the same end or to the same type of input-output conversion.”20 
It is obvious that higher levels of equifinality are preferable for any bureaucratic 
organization. The lack of a common database leads to very low level of equifinality in the 
procurement system. As far as the contracting procedures are similar in every different 
department of the Procurement Management Directorate, the only differences come from 
the established professional contacts and the nature of the product. The nature of the 
                                                 
18 Richard Daft, “Organization – Theory and Design”, Cincinnati, Ohio: South Western College, 
Publishing, 1998, 6th edition, p. 85. 
19 Richard Daft, “Organization – Theory and Design”, Cincinnati, Ohio: South Western College, 
Publishing, 1998, 6th edition, p. 88. 
20 David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, “Organization, Congruence, and Effectiveness: A Model for 
Diagnosing Organizational Behavior: Applying a Congruent Perspective”, New York, Harper and Row, 
Publishers, 1989. 
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product is easy to verify, so the main problem is the established contact. In this case a 
common database could increase significantly the effectiveness of the system.  
In conclusion, the bureaucratic and highly mechanistic organization of the 
procurement system is significantly incongruent with the necessary engineering 
technology of the process. The system could be organized in a different way if the risk 
and the uncertainty of the environment were not so high. Therefore the organization itself 
will likely oppose any significant changes of the system. But even within the present 
conditions some changes could be applied to the system that would lead to increased 
efficiency. 
 
C. LEGISLATIVE BASE 
 
The Ministry of Defense is not an independent institution but a structural part of 
the state under total civilian control. The Constitution of the state delegates the decision 
for the most specific function of the Armed Forces – the use of force, to the National 
Assembly of the Republic. The President and the Council of Ministers are the next 
government levels that are authorized by the Constitution to control the militaries. The 
Minister of Defense is responsible for implementation of the government policy into the 
Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. In such a way the acting legislation of 
Bulgaria is fully applicable for the military organization. In addition the policy of the 
acting government is mandatory for the Armed Forces.  
Consequently the legislation of the state is the highest level of acting rules, laws, 
and constraints for all the activities into the Ministry of Defense and the military 
organizations. The most important laws in force for the Ministry of Defense are The 
Defense Act21 and The Administration Act22. They lay out the military organizations and 
their respective roles. In addition they define the command authorities plus the 
responsibilities and the rights of all the agents connected with the national defense.  
                                                 
21 Defense Act, published in State Paper # 112 / December 27, 1995. 
22 Administration Act, published in State paper # 130 / October 05, 1998. 
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Also, the government issues policy documents that could be viewed as the 
political level of the acting legislation for the Ministry of Defense. The National Security 
Concept23 defines the policy of the Armed Forces, while The Military Doctrine24 
establishes the model for the use of power.  
The White Paper on Defense25 has no legislative power. Adopted with a decision 
of the Council of Ministers, it is an official guide for the Ministry of Defense and the 
Armed Forces’ structures, missions, goals, and organization. It is more focused on future 
perspectives regarding development of the Armed Forces, based on the government 
policy, without having the mandatory character of the acting legislation.   
The next level of documents in force is the prerogative of the Minister of Defense. 
It includes different instructions, statements, statutes, manuals, and orders that are issued 
to administer the activities and to delegate particular responsibilities throughout the 
Ministry of Defense and the military organizations.  
 
1. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT ACT 
 
Depending on their functional activities different structural elements of the 
Ministry of Defense and the General Staff should organize their work in accordance with 
other corresponding laws.  
This project is focused on the procurement system of the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Defense in which the Procurement Management Directorate is the most important 
structural part. All the procedures during the second stage of the acquisition process (see 
Figure 2) are based on the Public Procurement Act26. 
This act regulates the public procurement rules and procedures27. As far as this is 
legislation of the state it regulates procurement for all the budgetary organizations and 
institutions, health insurance and pension funds, and non-profit legal entities. It concerns 
                                                 
23 National Security Concept, published in State Paper # 46 / April 22, 1998. 
24 Military Doctrine, adopted with decision of the National Assembly on 04.08.1999, changed on February 
22, 2002. 
25 White Paper on Defense, adopted with decision of The Council of Ministers on April 04, 2002. 
26 Public Procurement Act, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
27 Public Procurement Act, Article 1, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
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all procurement procedures for contracts over specific limits, established with Article 7 of 
the Act.  
According to Article 2 of the Act28, its goal is to enhance the efficiency of 
spending the state budget and public resources through transparency, efficient control, 
competitive bidding, and stimulation of economic development.  
One of the most important articles for the Ministry of Defense is Article 6. It 
states that the Public Procurement Act is not applicable if the procurement procedure is 
connected with defense and security of the state, with national secrets, or if the contracts 
are connected with special security measures in accordance with the legislation of the 
state29. 
If the national and military secrets are well defined, it is difficult to distinguish the 
procurement procedures for the Ministry of Defense as important or not important for the 
defense and security of the state, except in the cases of procurement of food, primary 
services, raw materials, and some other products.  
The Public Procurement Act is not applicable if the procurement is in accordance 
with international agreements, that contain specific procedures, or if the assignment is 
connected with special procedure of a particular international organization30.  
Article 13 of the Act31 specifies three types of procedures: open procedure, 
limited procedure, and procedure of negotiating. The first type of procedure needs all the 
interested tenders to be informed properly with information published in the State paper 
and a central daily newspaper. 
With the second type of procedure the assignor decides which particular tenders 
to invite formally. The third procedure consists of direct negotiation with one or more 
specifically chosen tenders.  
The decision of what type of procedure to be assigned is based on the assessment 
of the “Security – Military Police and Military Counterintelligence” service for every 
                                                 
28 Public Procurement Act, Article 2, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
29 Public Procurement Act, Article 6, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
30 Public Procurement Act, Article 6, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
31 Public Procurement Act, Article 13, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
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particular case after formal request by the Procurement Management Directorate director. 
In fact the manufacturers and deliverers of spare parts and other specialized 
military equipment are limited in number. In this case the Act gives a possibility to the 
assignor to adopt limited procedure for procurement.32 In addition, as for procurement 
procedures for the Air Force, all the products are directly connected with combat 
possibilities of specialized military equipment like aircraft or helicopters. 
In most of the cases the answer which type of procedure should be adopted is 
obvious in advance and such a confirmation is ineffective and time consuming only. But 
in accordance with Instruction of the Minister of Defense33, those products still need 
confirmation for their importance for the defense and security of the state by the 
“Security – Military Police and Military Counterintelligence” service.  
Article 24 of the Act34 regulates which candidates cannot take part as tenders in 
public procurement procedures. The intention of this article is to defend the assignor from 
losses. But it still creates significant problems when dealing with foreign tenders that 
result from the differences in the legislations among the states. For example, according to 
the Act persons that have been sentenced for bankruptcy are not allowed to take part in 
the contest.35 But different laws deal in different ways with the finished sentences. 
Paragraph 2 of the same article defines that this requirement shall refer to the executive 
managers and the managing bodies of the tenders that should be evidenced by a 
document issued by the respective competent authority36.  
This requirement is valid for every single procurement procedure. In some states 
there is no procedure for issuing such a document. In fact most of the potential 
contractors are based outside Bulgaria but in this case most of them prefer not to take part 
in the contest procedures. This results in sharp shrinkage of the available contractors.  
                                                 
32 Public Procurement Act, Article 15, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
33 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Defense, issued on 
October 10, 2001. 
34 Public Procurement Act, Article 15, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
35 Public Procurement Act, Article 15, paragraph 1, point 2, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
36 Public Procurement Act, Article 24, paragraph 2 and 3, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
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The Legal Activities Directorate interpretation of this part of the Act is that such a 
requirement is mandatory for the main representative of the tender only. But in this case 
the Article loses its power because in any case there will be at least one representative 
that fulfills the requirements and that could mean nothing for the financial possibilities of 
the tender. Acceptable resolution of such a problem could be a proper interpretation of 
the article concerning the existing states’ legislations in every different case. 
Other problems arise with the implementation of Article 27 of the Act37, which 
regulates the type of documents that each proposal for contracting should contain. Again 
problems arise from differences in national laws. Sometimes it is difficult to explain the 
content and the meaning of some of the required documents to foreign tenders. In 
addition, Public Procurement Act does not differ the US state government’s authority 
from the federal one and does not consider the existing differences in the official 
documents’ certification.   
Paragraph 2 of Article 27 requires that “in cases when the candidate in a 
procedure is an association, and it is not a juridical person, the documents under 
paragraph 1 (for participating in contest procedure) shall be presented by each physical or 
juridical person member of the association.”38 In most of the cases such a requirement 
cannot be met in the given 30-day period for contest’s application preparation.  
Another problem arises when well-known persons that manage worldwide 
companies should guarantee their innocence or non-conviction for every particular 
procedure in which their company is a potential contractor. 
Again the problems could be decided with a proper interpretation of the article 
concerning the existing states’ legislations and the particularities of every different case. 
The Public Procurement Act is not intended for application in the Ministry of 
Defense only. In order to cover the particular conditions in its implementation in the 
military organization, the Minister of Defense issued an instruction that is a compilation 
of all the existing legislation, rules, statements and their interpretation. 
 
                                                 
37 Public Procurement Act, Article 27, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
38 Public Procurement Act, Article 27, paragraph 2, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
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2. INSTRUCTION OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE 
 
The Instruction is issued to regulate the planning, organization of assignment and 
control of the material and technical support, construction, and construction services into 
the Ministry of Defense and all the secondary budget managers assigned to the Minister 
of Defense. Article 2 of the Instruction defines all the subjects of procurement and that 
the Instruction is based on the Public Procurement Act and on the Regulation for 
assignment of public procurement procedures for contracts under particular limits of 
price39, arranged by the Public Procurement Act40.   
Article 3 defines the bodies (agencies) on planning, expert assessment, 
assignment and control in connection with the Instruction 41.  
The Minister of Defense is the main assignor of public procurement procedures in 
the Ministry of Defense. In accordance with the meaning of Article 3 of Instruction of the 
Minister of Defense42, assignor is a person that is authorized to initiate public 
procurement procedure. 
His Deputy on material and technical support and property management could 
assign public procurement procedures under the defined price limits. As technical 
executor of the procedures the Procurement Management Directorate is an assignor too, 
but without the rights to sign any contract. 
Military units’ commanders could purchase materials, products, and services 
under $ 5,000 after requests to the upper command, but in the limits of their assigned 
budget.  
This possibility could be useful with some of the western spare parts providers 
                                                 
39 Regulation for assignment of public procurement procedures for contracts under particular limits of 
price, adopted with Decree # 56 of the Council of Ministers, dated April 24, 2000. 
40 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 1, Ministry of Defense, 
issued on October 10, 2001. 
41 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 1, Ministry of Defense, 
issued on October 10, 2001. 
42 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 3, Ministry of Defense, 
issued on October 10, 2001. 
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that propose 48 hours policy for delivery of requested spare parts which is the case with 
Bell Helicopters Supply Center in Amsterdam. But this practice is not used for purchase 
of spare parts, because of the limited budgets assigned. Even with supported credit line 
for the Bulgarian Bell helicopters into the Supply Center the Procurement Management 
Directorate manages to request a spare part in one to three weeks, which is the time 
needed to receive the primary request from the air base to the Ministry of Defense with 
all the approvals needed.  
Financial control Directorate and the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense (see 
Figure 1) produce the overall control of the procurement system.43  
Standardization, Codification and Verification Agency (see Figure 3) is 
responsible for the expert assessment of contracts with defined characteristics or ordered 
procedure.44  
The Instruction arranges all the procurement procedures applicable in the 
procurement system with defining responsibilities of the actors and time constraints for 
fulfillment, and concerning the type of procedure assigned. It is a good opportunity for 
interpretation of the disputable articles of the Public Procurement Act, which is not used 
properly. 
Planning procedure arrangement is part of the Instruction, which is explained later 
in this chapter. 
 
3. OTHER DOCUMENTS 
 
All the players into the procurement system have their own instructions and 
statutes that are issued to administer the adopted practices. Some of them influence the 
processes of acquisition indirectly. For example, the “Regulations for providing and 
                                                 
43 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 3, paragraph 5, Ministry of 
Defense, issued on October 10, 2001. 
44 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 3, paragraph 3, Ministry of 
Defense, issued on October 10, 2001. 
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managing the quality”45 assign some responsibilities to the Procurement Management 
Directorate for quality of the acquired products and their standards verification.  
The Informational Strategy Concept of the Ministry of Defense46 defines the plans 
for future computerizing of the Ministry of Defense and establishment of a common 
internal communicational net. The Procurement Management Directorate is included in 
the plans for computerizing during particular time in the future, thus the communications 
will be improved significantly. At the same time that means time constraint for such an 
improvement too.  
Other documents mentioned above influence different procurement procedures at 
different stages. Some of them are included in the Instruction of the Minister of Defense 
and others are connected with the agents in the procurement system. This project is not 
focused on all the existing documents and their implementation. 
 
D. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM 
 
There is no common practice for different organizational parts of the Ministry of 
Defense to issue officially their visions, goals, or missions. The White Paper on 
Defense47 tries to present some ideas for the future of the organization and its parts, but it 
cannot be viewed as adopted policies or ways for development. The common 
understanding is that the accepted policies are embodied and enforced with the 
documents that arrange the organizational and procedural matters throughout the 
organization. On the other hand the bureaucratic character of the organization does not 
tolerate independent development or policy establishment. In such a situation the only 
acceptable policy is total compliance with the acting documents, acts, orders, and rules. 
Any new ideas should come with changes of the acting documents. This is not a creative 
environment but fits the bureaucratic character of the organization.  
                                                 
45 Regulation for providing and managing the quality of military and special products in the Ministry of 
Defense and the Bulgarian Army, issued 2001. 
46 Informational Strategy Concept of the Ministry of Defense, adopted by the Defense Council on 
04.20.1999. 
47 White Paper on Defense, adopted with decision of the Council of Ministers on April 04, 2002. 
 26 
According to the White Paper on Defense “the Procurement system is in a process 
of optimization with a view to guarantee quality and timely delivery of ordered items by 
improving the regulatory framework and establishing bodies of forwarding and control 
on quality of deliveries.”48 
In other words the process of optimization is viewed as strengthening of the 
bureaucratic character of the organization, which is not a creative approach towards 
changes. This defines the enormous opposition to any new ideas. 
“The defense procurement aims at providing the necessary material resources for 
maintaining and developing defense capability adequate to the security environment. The 
leading procurement principle is the “package capability”, i.e. comprehensive and 
complete equipping of the operational defense structures with optimized combat and 
support components. 49  
The biggest and unavoidable problem for the procurement system is the budget 
constraint. In a situation where the requested necessitates for acquisition are three to ten 
times higher than the available budget50, the only decision is to cover limited requests or 
emergent needs.  
“The system of maintaining the storage stock is set up in order to meet the needs 
of the Armed Forces in terms of the time necessary for the production capacities to make 
and deliver the military and non-military articles needed in times of crises.”51 
Most of the manufacturers and deliverers of spare parts and other products for the 
Air Force are outside Bulgaria. As far as most of the equipment originates from Russia, 
with the collapse of the USSR all the channels for delivery are disrupted, changed, or 
propose the same products at much higher prices.52 In such conditions the support of 
needed stock in storage is questionable. 
In conclusion the procurement system works with strict adherence of the existing 
regulatory documents with limited margins for creativity. There is strong opposition 
                                                 
48 White Paper on Defense, Chapter 4, part 4.10, The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2001 
49 White Paper on Defense, adopted with decision of the Council of Ministers on April 04, 2002. 
50 Information on budget insufficiency is not available officially. 
51 White Paper on Defense, Chapter 4, part 4.10, The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2001 
52 Information on price changes is not available officially. 
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against any changes that results from the bureaucratic character of the organization. 
Limited budget, disruptions in the previously established products’ delivery channels, and 
decreased number of available contractors defines strong inefficiency of the procurement 
system.   
 
E. THE PROCESS OF PLANNING 
 
The Instruction of the Minister of Defense53 arranges the process of planning the 
items for material and technical support of the armed forces. It regulates the time, the 
assigned activities and responsibilities throughout the process.  
There are three levels of planning. The third level includes the planning bodies of 
all the military formations and their corresponding Headquarters. The project is focused 
on the Air Force as an example for the planning process. This level produces planning for 
the different units and consolidated plans for the corresponding type of Armed Force. 
The Command for Material and Technical support (see Figure 3) from the 
General Staff structure presents the second level of planning. It is responsible for 
consolidated planning of all the Armed Forces.  
Budget Planning and Management Directorate from the Ministry of Defense 
structure (see Figure 1 and 3) is the first level of planning. It manages and controls the 
planning processes and establishes the link between the military formations and the 
Government through the Minister of Defense and the Council of Ministers. 
 
1. ANNUAL PLANNING 
 
Annual planning is the main form of planning process. Planning is the first stage 
of the acquisition process (see Figure 2). Usually it starts in April for the next year. In 
this case Year 1 is the year when the planning process for Year 2 starts. 
                                                 
53 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 1, Ministry of Defense, 
issued on October 10, 2001. 
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Figure 4 presents the procurement planning process for Year 2. Arrows with 
numbers present different steps of the process that connect the agents involved in the 
process. The positions of the arrows are in accordance with the time for fulfillment of the 
particular step of the process. 
Steps 1 and 2: Budget Planning and Management Directorate (BPMD) 
determines the budget limits for the next year in accordance with the planned activities 
and programs for development and sends it to the planning bodies from the third and 
second level not later than April 10. 
Step 3:  The Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ) gathers the requests for acquisition 
from its subordinated units and assigned troops and sends the consolidated request to the 
Command for Material and Technical Support (CMTS) not later than June 05. 
Step 4: CMTS gathers the requests from the Armed Forces Headquarters, 
prepares consolidated draft-plans for material and technical support, and sends it to the 
BPMD not later than June 30. 
Steps 5 and 6: BPMD presents the consolidated draft-plan to the Minister of 
Defense for endorsement and then to the Council of Ministers for approval. 
Steps 7 and 8: After approval the Council of Ministers returns the draft to the 
Ministry of Defense and sends a copy to the National Assembly for proceeding. 
Steps 9 and 10: BPMD presents to the planning bodies from the second and third 
level the newly established budget frames. 
Steps 11 and 12: AFHQ and BPMD revive their plans in accordance with the 
changes, provide 10% of the nomenclatures as reserve, and return them to the higher 
level of planning not later than 30 days after the approval of the Council of Ministers.  
Steps 13 and 14: BPMD sends to the Standardization, Codification, and 
Verification Agency the Common plan for Material and Technical Support for 
verification of the nomenclatures with standard database. After the verification the plan is 
returned to BPMD. Till October 01 the planning bodies from the third and second level 
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Steps 15, 16, 17, and 18: After accepting the annual budget for the Ministry of 
Defense with State’s Budget Act54 BPMD makes final adjustments of the budgets and 
announces the results to the planning bodies from the third and second level.  
Steps 19 and 20: Planning bodies from the third and second level prepare their 
final plans for material and technical support and present them to the upper level not later 
than 30 days after receiving the information for their budgets.  
Steps 21, 22, and 23: BPMD prepares Common Plan for Material and Technical 
Support, presents it to the Minister of Defense for endorsement and then sends it to the 
Procurement Management Directorate for fulfillment.  
 
2. PLANNING FOR ADDITIONAL ACQUISITIONS 
 
The Instruction of the Minister of Defense55 specifies procedures for acquisition of 
additional materials and services. The planning bodies from the third and second levels 
send requests for such acquisitions to the BPMD. BPMD, together with Defense Policy 
and Planning Directorate, analyze the possibilities for additional acquisitions and 
availability of financial resources, and make appropriate changes into the Common Plan 
for Material and Technical Support. 
 
F. DATA AVAILABILITY 
 
The Ministry of Defense does not issue information regarding results in the procurement 
system. Prices and clauses of contracts are trade secrets in accordance with the Trade 
Act56 and cannot be announced in public. 
 
                                                 
54 Issued every year. 
55 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 25, Ministry of Defense, 
issued on October 10, 2001. 




There are different constraints that affect the procurement system of the Ministry 
of Defense. Some of them cannot be waived, because of their origins, but others are 
under control of the Minister of Defense or lower command levels. The second type of 
constraints is more important to focus on, because they could influence the efficiency of 
the system in a short-term period.  
 
1. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
Financial constraints originate from the States Budget Act, issued every year by 
the National Assembly. Additional budget constraints result from different programs that 
the Ministry of Defense should fulfill during the year in accordance with the plans for 
joining NATO, joint exercises, and other activities in connection with International and 
other treaties, partnership, or other obligations. Those constraints cannot be changed 
because the Ministry of Defense cannot influence significantly in the short-term the 
Government decisions and policies. 
 
2. LEGISLATION CONSTRAINTS 
 
Other constraints that cannot be influenced by the Ministry of Defense in the 
short-term originate from the legislation of the state. For example, only the National 
Assembly could change some clauses in the Public Procurement Act57. But still a proper 
interpretation of the acting legislation, based on a legal advisors’ opinion, could be 
applied to some critical points that affect the procurement system. Those interpretations 




                                                 
57 Public Procurement Act, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
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3. TIME CONSTRAINTS 
 
All the periods for planning and acquisition procedures are defined into the acting 
instructions, statutes, or regulations. Their assignment reflects the system capabilities and 
usually is well weighted. They are all under control of the Ministry of Defense and could 
be changed properly if necessary. The most important time constraints come from the 
government level of command (see Figure 4, steps 7 and 15). The time for approval of 
the Draft-Plan for Material and Technical Support by the Council of Ministers could 
affect the work of the system significantly but still not critically due to the existing 
reserves of time for proceeding. But the time for the State’s Budget Act issuance is 
critical for all the procedures in the procurement system. The Ministry of Defense cannot 
affect both time constraints but still could reduce their influence on the system with 
proper internal measures. 
From 1990 till 1998 in several consecutive years the state’s budget was voted 
during the first six months of the budgetary year. That resulted in total disturbance of the 
acquisition process.  
Such problems are possible in the future too. In this case, the procurement system could 
start part of the most important procedures in advance and to finalize them after the 
budget approval. Anyway, some proper forecast of the available budget is not difficult to 
obtain. In addition the fiscal year cannot be prolonged but still part of the unrealized 
budget could be transferred intentionally to the next fiscal year for started already 
procedures.  
 
4. PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
 
The process’s design applies some constraints due to the time needed to fulfill 
different technical procedures. In this case some improvements to and optimizations of 
the processes could be done. For example, the requests for verification of the significance 
of the products acquired for the national security and defense could be sent to the 
Security-Military Police and Military Counterintelligence Service (see Figure 4, step 24 
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and 25) in advance and a common request for the whole Draft-Plan for Material and 
Technical Support Acquisition. Creation of common database of the importance of 
different nomenclatures is applicable too. It will result in a direct assignment of types of 
procedures for different set of products (see part C – Legislative Base, point 1 – Public 
Procurement Act).  
Other processes could be accomplished in parallel to each other. The question for 
optimization of the workflow could be a matter of further research. 
 
5. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
The bureaucratic character of the Ministry of Defense structure fits with the goals 
of the organization. That means that any changes of the structure towards creativity or 
wider independence will meet serious resistance. The most important constraint in the 
bureaucratic organizations is connected with the lack of horizontal communication and 
strictly vertical flow of information. Proper discussion of the importance of horizontal 
communication versus the need of centralization could lead to significant improvements 
of the information flow and time reduction for some of the procedures. Electronic 
exchange of information is applicable too and could be seen in most of the NATO 
members’ military structures.  
Some organizational constraints originate from the assignment of responsibilities 
throughout the procurement system. That leads to time delays of procedures’ fulfillment, 
communicational difficulties connected with vertical flows of information, and decreased 
responsiveness of different agents of the system. This could be overcome with proper 
reassignment of additional personal or common functional responsibilities throughout the 
system.  
Strong organizational constraints originate from the Legal Activities Directorate 
participation in the procurement system.   
The first one is connected with tenders’ assessment and classification during the 
assigned jury. The hardest problem is congruence among the legislations of different 
states. As far as the contracting procedures are held in Bulgaria, the potential foreign 
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contractors and participants in the contest for a procedure should recognize the Bulgarian 
legislation. In support of their preparation for the contest, they could be presented with 
proper templates of the required papers with relative explanations and guides. As far as 
the legislation does not change very often and does not differ significantly for different 
types of procedures, the templates could be easily created and supported.   
The second constraint originates from the contracts’ content. Usually different 
representatives of the Legal Activities Directorate participate in different stages of the 
contracting process. This results in different opinions on the contracts’ consistence. There 
is no universal contract applicable to any particular case, but still there are some 
significant points mandatory for every contract. Those points could be included in a 
contract template with proper common interpretation acceptable for all the legal advisors 
assigned to a procedure. Some proper explanations and variants could ensure the 
differentiation of the contracts in accordance with the existing specific conditions. But 
still the Legal Activities Directorate could propose common design of the contracts, 
acceptable for all the participants. Otherwise the procedure for adjusting the contracts in 
accordance with the opinion of every legal advisor becomes time-consuming and nearly 
impossible to accomplish. In fact, the Legal Activities Directorate has no delegated 
responsibilities for composing the contracts for acquisition but just to control the process. 
Changes in the assigned responsibilities will not increase the workload significantly but 
will optimize the process of contracting. 
In conclusion, some of the existing constraints for the procurement system are 
coming from upper levels of command and cannot be controlled efficiently in a short-
term period. But still their influence on the system could be changed with some proper 
measures applied. 
There are numerous of other constraints that originate from inside the system. 
They could be changed with proper activities or optimization of the processes in a short-
term period that would lead to increased efficiency of the system. The question for 





The Ministry of Defense organizational structure is purposefully designed as 
highly mechanistic and bureaucratic organization, with strong centralization of 
authorities, in order to sustain the existing uncertainty.  
The procurement system shares the same type of organization. There is a serious 
disconnect between the designed organization and the applied technology. But the high 
level of uncertainty and immense cost of risk acceptance impose such a structure. 
The designed organizational structure fits the policy of the government 
implemented in the Ministry of Defense under the control of the Minister of Defense.  
The Procurement Management Directorate is the main body of the in the 
procurement system, but it has no power to control the rest of the players in the system. It 
plays the main role during the second and the third stage of the acquisition process.  
There are several different laws that affect the procurement system in different 
stages of its work. The most important document is the Public Procurement Act. As far as 
this act is not written specifically for implementation in the military organization, there 
are several additional internal for the Ministry of Defense documents that give an 
interpretation of the concerned legislation, regulate the processes, and provide authorities, 
responsibilities, and processes’ design.  
The process of planning is well organized with enough time reserves in order to 
meet some time delays with external nature.  
There are several types of constraints that limit the effectiveness of the 
procurement system. As far as they cannot be eliminated totally, the system should find 
ways to decrease their effects on the system. 
With the new realms of international market relations, the legislation base cannot 
meet all the particularities of the existing foreign legislations. The adopted interpretation 
of the laws does not support fully the effectiveness of the system.  
There are no common practices different structural elements of the Ministry of 
Defense to announce officially their objectives, missions, goals, and principles.  
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The theory for organizing the structures and the processes in the procurement 
system does not fit totally the working process and the adopted practices. The theory 
alone presents some constraints on the system. But such a theory totally fits the military 
organization, the existing uncertainty of the environment, and the unacceptability of any 
risk that could influence negatively the national security and the defense capabilities of 







III. THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM IN PRACTICE 
 
The bureaucratic character of the military organization and the existing system of 
multileveled control ensures compliance with all the relevant legislation and internal 
documents. There is consequently no possibility for wide creativity; that would fully 
meet the intent of the system at the present. No significant differences should be expected 
between the theoretical design of the system and its practical application. Still, the nature 
of some of the processes during the second and the third stages of the acquisition process 
(see Figure 2) and the external character of some of the system’s agents could influence 
the overall process. The most worrisome factor for the system is time delay. 
 
A. THE PROCESS OF ACQUISITION 
 
The process of acquisition does not consist of the contract signing and its 
fulfillment only. It is a complex set of consecutive procedures that lead to acquisition of 
the requested product. All of those procedures have different levels of influence on the 
whole process. A well-designed, efficient system should address those influences to 
reduce their severity.  
 
1. STAGE ONE ACTIVITIES 
 
a. PLANNING ACTIVITIES 
 
Acquisition planning activities are core functions of planning bodies in three 
levels throughout the military organization (see Figure 4). The time frames for the 
planning procedures are well defined and the system has sufficient reserves of times for 
their fulfillment. The procedures are routine and fulfilled every year with minor changes.  
The most problematic external factors are the approval of the Draft-Plan for 
Material and Technical Support by the Council of Ministers and the State’s Budget Act 
issuance (see Figure 4). The Ministry of Defense cannot affect either of them.  Both of 
them could delay the process of planning but only the State’s Budget Act issuance could 
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be critical for the procurement system, since the budget is the basic factor for final 
adjustment and endorsement of Common Plan for Material and Technical Support. The 




The responsibilities at this stage are delegated by the relevant documents for the 
planning bodies in all the three levels. There are no particular responsibilities connected 
directly to the acquisition process. The Procurement Management Directorate has no 
control over the different players and over the process of planning itself. The flow of 




There is a strong congruence between the theoretical design of the planning 
process and its practical implementation. Limited time delays are not critical for the 
whole system. 
  
d. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
The strengths of the acquisition planning process are as follows: 
• Routine operation with little changes. This makes good use of existing 
experience. 
• Wide time frames for the designed processes. This ensures time reserves for 
fulfillment of the processes. 
• Visibility, equifinality, and clarity of the processes. This ensures the control 
over the process.  
• Three significant adjustments of the plans for individual acquisition projects. 
The plans could be adjusted properly.  
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• Strong congruence between theory and practice. The applied procedures fit the 
relevant acts and documents.  
The weaknesses of the acquisition planning process are as follows: 
• No particular responsibilities in connection with the acquisition process. This 
could lead to irrelevance in the final stages of the process. 
• External influence on the system. This could be critical for system’s 
efficiency.  
• No control over the external influence. The system cannot control the 
influence, but only react to the consequences.  
• The acquisition planning process is not optimized. Such optimization could be 
a matter of further research. 
• No horizontal communication, which would help the system to reduce the 
critical external influence.  
• The Procurement Management Directorate has no control and information for 
the acquisition planning process. Preliminary information could help the 
system to prevent critical external influences and to avoid significant time 
delays.  
• The Common Plan for Material and Technical Support has no final date 
frames for acquisition of the products. Most of the products are necessary to 
be acquired in different periods of the fiscal year. 
 
2. STAGE TWO ACTIVITIES  
 
The second stage of the acquisition process – contracting activities (see Figure 2), 
consists of marketing, competition assignment, and contracting processes. An Instruction 
of the Minister of Defense regulates the activities during the second stage58 based on the 
                                                 
58 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Defense, issued on 
October 10, 2001. 
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Public Procurement Act59. There are six different procedures that should be completed 
for every assigned acquisition process at this stage. Figure 5 presents a cycle of the three 
processes with their corresponding procedures included into the Contracting activities. 
Arrows with numbers present the consecutive steps in the procedures, starting with step 




Step 23: BPMD sends to the Procurement Management Directorate the endorsed 
Common Plan for Material and Technical Support for fulfillment. 
Steps 24 and 25: Procurement Management Directorate coordinates with the 
Security-Military Police and Military Counterintelligence Service (see Figure 1) all the 
nomenclatures planned for open procedures.60 
If the proposed specifications are not planned for open procedures, the 
Procurement Management Directorate Director sends requests to SMPCS for 
confirmation of the type of acquisition procedure that should be assigned. This is the first 
separate procedure during the contract activities – type of procedure confirmation. The 
Procurement Management Directorate cannot control the procedure and there is no time 
assigned for its fulfillment. 
Steps 26, 27 and 28: The relevant Department of the Procurement Management 
Directorate (see Figure 3) contacts statistic agencies and fulfills market research for 
establishing the existing prices for the product(s)61. This is the second separate procedure 
during the contracting activities – Price marketing. There is no term assigned for its 
fulfillment. 
                                                 
59 Public Procurement Act, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999. 
60 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 23, paragraph 2, Ministry of 
Defense, issued on October 10, 2001. 
61 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 32, Ministry of Defense, 
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Figure 5: Procedures during the Contracting Activities – Year 2. 
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b. COMPETITION ASSIGNMENT 
 
Step 29: If an open type is assigned for a procedure, the Procurement 
Management Directorate should send the information to the State paper and at least to 
one Daily Newspaper in order to inform all the interested suppliers not later than January 
21, Year 262. For non-planned procedures additional publications are acceptable. 
Step 30: After the market research for price establishment, the Procurement 
Management Directorate prepares draft of decision for assignment and presents it to the 
assignor (the Minister of Defense) for endorsement. The decision should include the 
requirements to the suppliers, the assessment criteria and their weight, model for 
assessment, required documents and certificates, and quality requirements. The 
Procurement Management Directorate sends invitations to potential suppliers or informs 
them through a publication in the State’s paper and one daily newspaper. The invitation 
includes term for receiving a proposal from the candidates, which is usually 45 days from 
the date of publication or sending the invitation. This term could be prolonged no more 
than 30 days if less than three proposals are received during the term, or could be 
decreased to 30 days if information for the procedure has been published in advance.63  
Step 31: The candidate prepares and sends a proposal that includes all the 
necessary documents and information. The representatives of the Procurement 
Management Directorate consult the candidates on the procedure and the assigned 
requirements in accordance with the Trade Act64. Steps 29, 30, and 31 present the third 
separate procedure during the contracting activities – Proposals submission.  
Step 32 and 33: The Minister of Defense assigns jury for proposals’ assessment 
in accordance with his Instruction65. Some additional experts could be included in the 
jury if the participants need particular knowledge. The assigned jury assesses the 
                                                 
62 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 23, paragraph 2, Ministry of 
Defense, issued on October 10, 2001. 
63 Public Procurement Act, Article 34, published in State Paper # 56 / June 22, 1999 
64 Trade Act, last changed and published on October 13, 2000. 
65 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 39, Ministry of Defense, 
issued on October 10, 2001. 
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candidates and presents detailed minutes on its work and decision not later than seven 
days after their meeting. The representatives of the Procurement Management Directorate 
that prepare the particular procedure assist the jury with necessary information but do not 
take part in the assessment. Steps 32 and 33 present the fourth separate procedure during 




Steps 34, 35, 36, and 37: The representatives of the Procurement Management 
Directorate prepare draft contract and present it to the Legal Activities Directorate, to 
Budget Planning and Management Directorate, and to the assigned Deputy Minister of 
Defense for approval. The draft contract is based on the candidate proposal that wins the 
competition. There are no additional negotiations on the proposed items, only on the 
meaning of the contract’s clauses. 
In case of specific importance or too costly contracts the Minister of Defense 
could assign a special commission for negotiating and contracting procedures. In this 
case representatives of the Procurement Management Directorate take part in the 
procedures and prepare the contracts under the Legal Activities Directorate supervision; 
but higher levels of hierarchy conduct the negotiations. This does not contradict the 
procedure because the Minister of Defense is still the only official assignor of the 
procurement procedure in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 4, point 1 of the 
Instruction66. 
There is no particular representative of the Legal Activities Directorate assigned 
to a particular acquisition process, except for very important contracts. Otherwise 
contracting is not core function for the Legal Activities Directorate. The process could be 
time consuming if several different legal advisors have different opinions on the contract 
content. This is the fifth procedure during the contracting activities – Contract 
preparation. 
                                                 
66 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Defense, issued on 
October 10, 2001. 
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Step 38, 39, and 40: The Procurement Management Directorate representative 
prepares the contract for signing after the approvals from the previous procedure. This is 




During the second stage of the acquisition process - Contracting activities (see 
Figure 2), the representatives of the Procurement Management Directorate are 
responsible for the specifics of the process, and for observation of all the acting 
legislation and internal documents. Figure 5 presents a cycle of six procedures that should 
be fulfilled for every single acquisition procedure. There are no terms assigned for 
beginning and end of most of the procedures except for the Proposals submission (see 
steps 29, 30, and 31 on Figure 5) and for the Proposal assessment. In all the cases the 
Procurement Management Directorate has little control over the processes after their 
initiation.  
The Procurement Management Directorate representatives are responsible for 
fulfillment of all the intended acquisitions in the Common Plan for Material and 
Technical Support. They start the procedures with receiving the endorsed plan (see step 
23 on Figure 4 and 5) and preparing the contracts for signing before the end of October. 
All the payments on the contracts should be done not later than the end of November 
when the fiscal year closes. Contract payment is not the responsibility of the Procurement 





The design of the procedures during the Contracting Activities is in congruence 
with the bureaucratic character of the Ministry of Defense organization.  
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However the responsibilities of the players in the procurement system are not in 
congruence with the assigned procedures. Proper delegation of personal responsibilities 
and terms for fulfillment of some of the processes could accelerate the process.  
In addition, improvement of the processes is possible. For example, the type of 
procedure confirmation (steps 24 and 25 on Figure 5) could be done together for all the 
products planned for acquisition. Proper database for nomenclatures’ importance, 
approved in advance will shorten the procedure. Such a confirmation of all the 
nomenclatures could be done even before the Common Plan endorsement.  
Price marketing (steps 26, 27, and 28 on Figure 3) includes contacts with statistic 
agencies and market research of available for the moment prices of the product(s)67. In 
addition, with the fluctuations of the market, such an inquiry cannot guarantee the real 
price of the product(s), that the vendor will include in its proposal. This procedure aims 
to show the vendors with the most proper trade practices. Therefore such marketing could 
be done in advance too. This will shorten the cycle on Figure 5 significantly.  
Proper database of available suppliers and their fields of activities could shorten 
the process for contacting with potential suppliers during the Proposals submission 
process (step 30 on Figure 5).  
 
f. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
The strengths of the stage two – Contracting activities (see Figure 2), are as 
follows: 
• Strong congruence of the processes with the bureaucratic character of the 
Ministry of Defense organization. This congruence fits the organization.  
• The design of the processes ensures the observance of the acting legislation 
and internal documents.  
• Ease of overall control on the procurement activities.  
                                                 
67 Instruction on planning, organization of assignment and control of the material and technical support, 
construction, and construction services into the Ministry of Defense, Article 32, Ministry of Defense, 
issued on October 10, 2001. 
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The weaknesses of the Contracting activities are as follows: 
• After initiating the procedures, the Procurement Management Directorate 
representatives cannot control the procedures.  
• Lack of horizontal communication. 
• The procedures are not fully optimized.  
• The congruence with the present organizational character will lead to strong 
resistance to any changes. 
• Most of the contracts are signed during the third quarter of the year due to the 
technical time needed for fulfillment of the procedures. Thus, most of the 
products will be delivered at the end of the year. Supplies in the beginning of 
the year are possible with emergency requests only.  
• Long-term contracting is not a common practice.  
 
3. STAGE THREE ACTIVITIES 
 
Stage three activities – contracts fulfillment (see Figure 2), are connected with the 
products’ delivery, contracts’ supervising, and warranty procedures. All those activities 
come as additional responsibilities for the Procurement Management Directorate without 
having financial responsibilities on the contracts’ payments. The Minister of Defense, as 
a side in the contracts, authorizes the Procurement Management Directorate to control 
their fulfillment. The final users report all the problems on the contracts throughout the 
vertical channels of communication to the Procurement Management Directorate, which 
forwards them in accordance with the available decisions. 
This project is not focused on the Contract fulfillment activities. Problems in 




B. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM 
 
There are different criteria to assess the effectiveness of a system. The most 
critical factors for the Ministry of Defense procurement system are congruence with the 
acting legislation and internal documents, time for fulfillment of the acquisition 
procedures, and budget savings.  
 
1. CONGRUENCE WITH ACTING LEGISLATION  
 
As it was underlined several times there is a strong congruence between the 
design of the procurement system and the military organization. This congruence 
supports strict obligation of the acting legislation and all the internal documents, rules, 
and regulations. The strong centralization of the organization supports strict control over 
the processes, in order to prevent the risk of failures that could affect significantly the 
national security and defense capabilities of the Armed Forces. Therefore the 
procurement system is effective in the application of the acting legislation and internal 
documents that fits the existing bureaucratic military organization. 
On the other hand, the Ministry of Defense should prepare the military 
organization for NATO membership in a period of two to three years. But with such a 
strict bureaucratic organization any changes will be difficult. In addition the procurement 
system should adopt some new practices applied in leading NATO countries. Such 
practices and changes will meet strong resistance and could be applied with total changes 
of the existing documents. Therefore the procurement system is not effective for any 
changes and innovations.  
 
2. TIME EFFECTIVENESS 
 
In order to reach higher congruence with the acting legislation, the procurement 
system adopts a structure that has low time effectiveness. There is no possibility for 
regular supplies throughout the year, and most of the contracts for acquisition are for a 
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period less than a year. That means contracts with similar contents need to be developed 
during the next year.  
In order to reach total obligation of the existing legislature, some of the 
procedures are strictly regulated as time for fulfillment, content, and channels of 
communication. Such an arrangement in most of the cases is time consuming.  
In fact, congruence with the existing legislation is much more important for the 
Ministry of Defense than the timeliness of the acquisition processes. At the present this 
could fit the military organization because of decreased volumes of acquisitions. But the 
procurement system should definitely improve its time effectiveness in order to meet the 
NATO standards. 
 
3. BUDGET EFFECTIVENESS 
 
This project is not focused on the possibilities for budget savings with changing 
the existing practices. There is no research in the Ministry of Defense of Bulgaria on this 
topic, and there is no available information on the matter. Still, the low effectiveness of 
some of the existing practices is obvious. For example, the lack of negotiations with the 
potential suppliers on the contracts’ clauses after the assessment empowers the “status 
quo” of the assessed proposal, which is the best one among the proposals, but not 
necessarily the best available in the market. Sometimes the same vendor or company 
takes part in the competition assignment with two or three different and independent 
representatives. In such a way the vendor could dictate the prices and the results of the 
procedure.  
At the present moment the budget of the Ministry of Defense of Bulgaria is not so 
big and the real effect of the savings from any improvements are not so tangible. Yet the 
procurement system could be improved to enhance its budgetary effectiveness. Such an 





4. THE EFFECT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
At the present moment, when the Armed Forces of Bulgaria are in a process of 
transition and total reorganization, the most important factor is the stability of the 
organization. In this case the congruence of the procurement system with the existing 
legislation is essential.  
On the other hand, optimization of the acquisition processes could increase 
significantly both the timeliness and the budgetary effectiveness of the procurement 
system. That would positively influence the national security and defense capabilities of 
the Bulgarian Armed Forces. In addition, adopting the best practices of the leading 
NATO members in the acquisition processes would support faster integration of Bulgaria 
into the Atlantic organization. In other words, the effectiveness of the Ministry of 
Defense procurement system influences directly the national security and the defense 




In conclusion, the highly bureaucratic character of the existing Ministry of 
Defense organization does not leave wide scope for creativity in its procurement system, 
but the practices applied in the acquisition processes are very close to the theory. Some 
external factors could influence significantly the effectiveness of the system. And, there 
are some possibilities for real improvements. The Minister of Defense has the power to 
enforce some changes with proper interpretation of the acting legislation in the internal 
documents that regulate the processes. Some flexibility of the processes will increase the 
time effectiveness of the system too. In such a way, the negative external influences 



























IV. KEY AREAS FOR POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS 
 
In every organization a set of different factors could influence the applicability of 
any improvement. To understand those factors means to be prepared to meet and to 
manage the resistance against changes.  
It is not enough to find a way for improvement. Much more difficult is to make 
people accept the innovation. Especially in a case when the designed working technology 
and its implementation fully fits the present organizational requirements (as in the case of 
the Ministry of Defense procurement system).  
In addition, if the risk of failure directly influences the national security and the 
defense capabilities of the state, forcing any change is nearly impossible, or should be 
done by highly motivated and empowered people that can control the organization from 
its top management position or from outside68.  
 
A. BARRIERS TO IMPROVEMENTS 
 
There are three important types of constraints against improvements in the 
procurement system of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense – legislative, organizational 
and personal. Other factors could influence any improvements significantly too, but not 
critically. For example, budget limitations could be vital for other organizations but the 
procurement system needs little money in support of its activities.  
 
1. LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS 
 
The performance of the procurement system is based on strict observance of the 
enacted legislation. Even internal Ministry of Defense documents are based on that 
legislation. This fact reflects the public character of the military organization and the 
strict civilian control over use of the available resources for the national security and 
defense capabilities of the state.  
                                                 
68 Peter M. Sange, “ The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization” Currency 
Doubleday, New York, 1994. 
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In this case acting legislation is the only available frame of reference for the 
procurement system. That constrains the system from any unlawful changes. Radical 
changes should be supported by proper legislative changes. In such a way, radical 
changes for the procurement system could be initiated only by a decision of the state’s 
government. 
 
2. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
As part of the Ministry of Defense organization, the procurement system shares 
its characteristics. Highly mechanistic and bureaucratic, with strong centralization of 
command (see Chapter II) the procurement system cannot change itself alone in the 
presence of risk of costly failure. Some improvements of existing method is possible, but 
not a radical change of the system from inside.  
Such a character is not developed without reason. This structure ensures the total 
civilian control over the Armed Forces. As a public budgetary organization with great 
significance, the military organization has no right to make independent decisions for 
changes, even to avoid critical national security failures.  
In addition, the organization alone will tend to stay in its last stable position. This 
does not equate to effectiveness but to controllability of the processes. Thus, any changes, 
that mean unbalancing of the system will lead to strong organizational resistance. Any 
change must be imposed by powers stronger than the organizational one to resist.  
 
3. PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS 
 
Permanent reductions of personnel in the Bulgarian Armed Forces after 1990 
increase the personal uncertainty significantly. Fear of losing one’s job paralyzes 
creativity and generates strong personal resistance against any improvement. Higher 
effectiveness of the system could mean decreased needs for staff. In such conditions, the 
beliefs are that only the person that totally fits the system could sustain his position. If 
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nothing else, to fit the system means to accept the present conditions of the organization. 
Such beliefs increase the strength of organizational resistance.  
The existing uncertainty for the future of the staff additionally decreases the 
motivation for changes throughout the organization. Nobody is willing to take the risk of 
changes if he is not sure if he will have the same position tomorrow or in a month. 
In conclusion, the staff and the organization of the procurement system are not 
willing to change. There is a strong personal and organizational resistance against any 
change.  
In order to initiate a radical change the government should effect some changes in 
the acting legislative base. But there should be a strong motivation in order to do so. 
Otherwise any changes of previously accepted legislation mean ineffectiveness of the 




There are several possible sources of motivation for changes not only in the 
procurement system, but also in the whole military organization.  
 
1. COMPLIANCE WITH NATO STANDARDS 
 
In November 2002 Bulgaria was invited formally to start procedures for NATO 
membership. Along other tasks and programs for fulfillment, this means full 
compatibility of the military equipment and of the adopted procedures and technologies 
of administration. The membership could be used as a basic reason for changes of the 
legislation by the state’s government. This will force changes in the military structures 
too. 
As a matter of fact, the organization of some of the main military structures was 
already transformed in accordance with the corresponding NATO structures and symbols. 
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But some of them still use the old administrative models due to the unchanged legislative 
base.  
As far as the government structures that should initiate and proceed any changes 
of the legislation are not informed what to change, proper proposal from the Minister of 
Defense should be issued. They should include analysis of existing NATO practices, best 
practices of acquisition in NATO members, future trends and what should be changed in 
the legislation in order to effect the innovations. Any existing structural analyses, models, 
and additional explanations on the topic could be useful. The development of such a 
proposal could be addressed in future research. 
 
2. RESOURCE UTILIZATION 
 
Resource utilization could become a source of motivation for changes with 
delegation of personal responsibilities in such a direction. This approach could be very 
difficult for implementation due to the lack of proper base for comparison or lack of 
proper system for measurement of the utilization. Additional incentives could be applied 
to involve different players in the process of changes.  
In a moment of limited budget availability, the question for proper resource 
utilization is important. There are two levels of analysis that could be distinguished: 
internal analysis or how to reach better utilization of the budget available with the 
existing legislation base, and external analysis or what should be changed in the acting 
legislation to enforce positive changes of the acquisition practices. Both analyses should 
be focused on the efficiency of the procurement system, the best practices available, and 








3. STATED OBJECTIVES, MISSIONS, AND GOALS 
 
The White Paper on Defense69 is an official guide throughout the Ministry of 
Defense (see Chapter II). It is adopted by decision of the Council of Ministers, but it has 
an explanatory character, not a legislative one. This paper is a good place for providing 
vision, objectives, and missions of the main elements of the Ministry of Defense. Such 
statements are not a common practice in the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, but are 
widely adopted by the structural elements of NATO Command and military organizations 
of NATO members.  
In so far as the Council of Ministers is a government organization, it could issue 
proposals to the National Assembly to empower the White Paper on Defense as part of 
the acting legislation, after proper changes and statement of goals and missions for the 
key parts of the military organization.   
Legislative provision of additional responsibilities to key command structures and 
representatives, in connection with the missions’ support, goals’ achievement, and 
objectives’ realization will motivate the system towards efficient changes.  
This issue needs additional research and analysis. 
 
4. INCENTIVES FOR IMPROVEMENTS 
 
The Ministry of Defense, as a public budgetary organization, does not 
automatically provide incentives for improvements. There is no additional system of 
incentives for improvements. With the existing aversion to risk, no one within the system 
is willing to initiate any changes.  
Development and implementation of a system that provides incentives for 
innovations and tolerates the changes will motivate the involved personnel to take part in 
the process of change. This could also be a matter of further research. 
                                                 
69 White Paper on Defense, adopted with decision of the Council of Ministers on April 04, 2002. 
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The implementation of such a system should be specifically addressed in the 
legislation base too. 
 
C. AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENTS 
 
There are different key areas for improvement of the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Defense procurement system. They could be grouped in three main groups – legislative, 




The Public Procurement Act70 is the most important legislation for the 
procurement system. All the rules and methods applicable to the system are based on this 
act. The Act itself is developed in accordance with existing acts in most of the developed 
states. It is based on the same public and economic intentions (see Chapter II). But, some 
parts of the act could still be interpreted in different ways. This results in some diversity 
in its implementation. The situation is avoidable with proper research on the 
implementation of similar acts in other states that could result in recommendations to the 
government for changes in the Act.  
In addition, comparison of the implementation of acts, similar to the Public 
Procurement Act, could be spread in a level of structures equal to the Ministry of 
Defense. In this case, the subject of comparison would be the interpretation of the act in 
its direct implementation. Such a research could result in recommendations for proper 
reflection of the act in order to avoid differences with foreign legislations. Those 
recommendations could be embodied in papers and internal documents that regulate the 
act’s direct implementation.  
 
 
                                                 




The organizational structure of the procurement system reflects the 
Administration Act71, the policy, and the organizational structure of the Ministry of 
Defense. In this case, little could be done for changes of the procurement system 
structural design. 
Much more important is the possibility for delegating additional responsibilities 
throughout the system, communication improvements, and optimizing the horizontal 
interconnections. 
Delegating additional responsibilities could affect the personal interest of 
involved players from different than the Procurement Management Directorate structures. 
For example, personal assignment of representatives from the Legal Activities 
Directorate (see Figures 4 and 5) to particular contracts and their responsibility for the 
contracts’ fulfillment will increase their motivation in the contracting process 
participation.  
Communication improvements will increase the speed of flow of information that 
will significantly shorten delays. With previously available information, preparation for 
most of the procedures could be done in advance.  
Horizontal interconnections do not necessarily mean changes in existing 
authority. Such interconnections could be useful for proper coordination of the processes 
and much more efficient participation of the different players. 
Assignment of missions, goals, and vision could be used in support of policy 
towards changes. Such formal adoption of directions for development with proper 




The procedures assigned to the acquisition process are far from optimum.  
                                                 
71 Administration Act, published in State paper # 130 / October 05, 1998. 
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The influence of some time constraints could be avoided with advanced 
preparation and fulfillment of parts of the procedures in parallel with other procedures, 
wherever it is acceptable within the acting legislation base. For example, the type of 
procedure confirmation (steps 24 and 25 on Figure 5) could be done before the 
endorsement of the Common Plan for Material and Technical Support. The confirmation 
issued for particular procedure does not mean that the procedure needs to be fulfilled later 
on.  
Furthermore, the procedure for price marketing does not impose any further 
obligations for contracting. In this case this procedure could be done for the 
nomenclatures included in the consolidated draft plan for material and technical support 
(steps 4, 5, and 6 on Figure 4). 
In addition, personal responsibilities in connection with assigned terms for some 
of the procedures that involve players from other military structures (see Figure 5) will 
shorten the time for their fulfillment. 
There are different theories for optimization of organizations and procedures. 
They could be implied additionally for further optimization of the procurement system 
without changing its legislation base.  
For example, the theory of supply chain effectiveness is well developed and 
available. But still its implementation depends on the readiness of the system to adopt 
such practices. Key elements in its implementation are knowledge and motivation for 
improvements. As far as the knowledge is accessible, again the motivation throughout the 
system is critical.  
Further comparison of foreign experience or adopted best practices could lighten 
different ways for improvements. The applicability of those practices could be addressed 




There are three main areas for further improvements of the procurement system. 
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Improvements of the applicable legislation are difficult to obtain, but not 
impossible. The most important factor here is the involvement of the government as the 
only legitimate institution to change the legislation. 
Some structural areas for improvement are available as well. They do not need 
changes in the legislation base and could be applied easily with changes of internal 
Ministry of Defense documents. 
The processes adopted in the procurement system are not fully optimized. New 
theories could be applied for improving the system efficiency. They could involve 
changes in the legislative base or in internal Ministry of Defense documents only. 
There is no body of research available on the improvement of the Bulgarian 






























A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
The Ministry of Defense organizational structure is deliberately designed to be 
highly mechanistic and bureaucratic, with strong centralization of authority, in order to 
sustain the existing level of uncertainty.  
The procurement system shares the same type of organization. There is a serious 
disconnect between the designed organization and the applied technology. But the high 
level of uncertainty and immense cost of risk taking impose such a structure. 
The designed organizational structure fits the policy of the government 
implemented in the Ministry of Defense under the control of the Minister of Defense.  
The Procurement Management Directorate is the main body of the procurement 
system, but it has no power to control the rest of the players in the system. It plays the 
main role during the second (Contracting activities) and the third (Contracts fulfillment) 
stages of the acquisition process.  
There are several laws that affect the procurement system in different stages of its 
work. The most important document is the Public Procurement Act. Since this act is not 
written specifically for implementation in the military organization, there are additional 
internal Ministry of Defense documents that interpret the relevant legislation, regulate the 
processes, and provide authorities, responsibilities, and processes’ design.  
The process of planning is well organized with enough time reserves to cope with 
time delays due to external influences.  
There are several types of constraints that limit the effectiveness of the 
procurement system. As far as they cannot be eliminated totally, the system should find 
ways to decrease their effects on the system. 
With the new realms of international market relations, the legislative base cannot 
meet all the particularities of the existing foreign legislation. The existing interpretation 
of the laws does not support fully the effectiveness of the system.  
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There are no common practices for the different structural elements of the 
Ministry of Defense to announce officially their objectives, missions, goals, and 
principles.  
The theory for organizing structures and processes in the procurement system 
does not completely fit the working process and the existing practices. That theory 
imposes some constraints on the system, but totally fits the military organization, the 
existing uncertainty of the environment, and the unacceptability of risk to national 
security. 
The highly bureaucratic character of the Ministry of Defense organization does 
not leave room for creativity in its procurement system; but the practices applied in the 
acquisition processes are very close to the theory. Some external factors could influence 
significantly the effectiveness of the system. There are some possibilities for 
improvements. The Minister of Defense has the power to effect some changes with 
proper interpretation of the acting legislation in the Ministry of Defense documents that 
regulate the processes. Some flexibility of the processes would increase the timeliness of 
the system too. In such a way, the negative external influences could be reduced properly.  
Stage one activities are connected with the process of planning. The Procurement 
Management Directorate has no control over the processes. Some of the external factors 
could affect the system seriously that could result in time delays. Stage two activities are 
responsibility of the Procurement Management Directorate. The Directorate has no power 
over the players, but is responsible for proper preparation and fulfillment of the 
procedures.  
During the third stage (Contracting fulfillment) the Procurement Management 
Directorate is responsible for contracts’ fulfillment, warranty procedures, and 
replacement of nomenclatures. This stage is not in the scope of the present project.  
The system imposes severe constraints against any changes. Some of those 
constraints are embodied in the legislation base and cannot be changed by the 
Procurement Management Directorate. The organization itself and the employees in the 
system create other constraints that are severe but not unavoidable.  
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The Ministry of Defense and the procurement system as part of it, need different 
ways to motivate changes. The strongest motivation for a bureaucratic system, such as 
the Procurement Management Directorate, could come with legislative changes. This is 
time consuming and does not depend on the Ministry of Defense. Some other activities, 
such as adopting incentives for improvements, could stimulate personnel to face changes. 
There are three main areas for further improvements of the procurement system: 
legislative, structural, and procedural. 
There is no body of research available on the improvement of the Bulgarian 




This project intended to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION: 
What is the congruence between the theoretical and the legislative bases for 
developing the procurement system of the Ministry of Defense and the present 
practices applied with its functioning? 
There are very little and insignificant deviations between the theoretical and the 
legislative bases for developing the procurement system of the Ministry of Defense and 
the present practices applied with its functioning. This results from the purposefully 
designed structure of the system in support of the civilian control over the military 
organization. This congruence fits the present conditions in the military organization, but 
impedes the system’s ability to make changes and innovate. 
 
2. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
 
Where is the position of the procurement system in the structures of the 
Ministry of Defense and the other military organizations? 
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The procurement system is a part of the Ministry of Defense structure, sharing the 
same characteristics of highly mechanistic and bureaucratic organization with all the 
applicable limitations of such characteristics.  
Which are the theoretical and the legislative bases for the procurement 
system functioning? 
The working procedures in the procurement system are based on a strict 
compliance of all the acting legislation relevant to the processes of acquisition of 
materials and services. All the other additional internal documents that affect the 
procurement system are based on the legislation too. Such compliance with the acting 
legislation is the most important principle of the procurement system. 
What is the structure of the planning process in connection with the 
procurement system? 
Planning process is assigned to different planning bodies in three levels of 
planning. The first level includes the Armed Forces and their assigned Headquarters. The 
second level includes the Command for Material and Technical Support. Both levels are 
under the General Staff command. The third level includes the Budget Planning and 
Management Directorate from the Ministry of Defense organizational structure. The 
Procurement Management Directorate as the main player in the procurement system has 
no control over the planning procedures that consist of the first stage’s procedures of the 
acquisition process. 
Which are the strengths and the weaknesses of the system? 
The congruence between theory and practice is the main strength of the system at 
the present moment. It fits totally the existing organizational characteristics and the 
adopted practices in the Ministry of Defense. For future development of the procurement 
system this congruence could become a significant obstacle against any changes and 
improvements. NATO membership will bring necessities for changes in the military 
organization, therefore in the procurement system too, in order to reach full compatibility 
of structures and practices among the allies. Such necessities for changes could become 
primary motivation factor for improvements and replacement of the existing practices. 
The main weakness of the system results from the highly mechanistic and 
bureaucratic character of the organizational structure. This character defines strong 
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organizational and personal resistance against any changes or improvements and opposes 
any creativity.  
In addition, the Ministry of Defense has no influence on the legislation issuance, 
which is prerogative of the government. In such a way only the government has the 
power to enforce any changes in the military system with proper changes of the relevant 
legislation. This is a difficult and time-consuming process.  
Which are the key areas for improvements? 
There are several different areas for improvements that could be grouped in 
legislative, structural, and procedural ones. Any legislative and some of the structural 
improvements should be enforced by the government with adoption of proper changes in 
the acting legislation. Other structural and most of the procedural improvements could be 
initiated with internal changes for the Ministry of Defense document that are prerogative 
of the Minister of Defense. There are no any particular researches for possible 
improvements and optimizations of the procurement system till now.  
Which are the additional questions that should be analyzed further? 
This question is answered later on in this chapter. 
 
3. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The effectiveness of the procurement system is limited by set of constraints. The 
existing financial and legislation constraints cannot be overcome at the level of the 
Ministry of Defense. Still the procurement processes have some reserves and means to 
deal with such constraints and to reduce their influence. Some time, process, and 
organizational constraints could be reduced or fully eliminated by changes in internal for 
the Ministry of Defense documents.  





C. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. SHORT TERM RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
• Optimization of the system with a new model of horizontal communications; 
• Assignment of additional responsibilities in connection with the procurement 
system; 
• Routine meetings of the system’s players to prepare proposals for proper 
interpretation of the relevant legislation; 
• Contract templates with common recommendations for clauses; 
• Reconsidering and adjusting the papers needed for participation in 
competition; 
• Web-based site for the procurement system with all the necessary explanations 
of procedures, documents required, and proper templates; 
• Optimization of the planning process based on best practices for the supply 
chain management; 
• Optimization of the time-flow diagram of the procedures adopted in the 
procurement system; 
• Additional optimization of some of the procedures – unified procedures, 
parallel activities, preliminary preparations and fulfillment of some of the 
practices; 
• Development of common database for potential vendors, prices, quality, and 
assortment; 
• Development of larger horizontal interconnections with overall control vs. 
formal vertical channels of authority;  
• Adoption of new more effective contracting practices; 
• Long-term contracting; 
• Research and implementation of selected best practices of other trade 
organizations or acquisition units; 
• Adoption of E-business practices; 
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• Improved internal communicational net; 
• Adoption of new forms of competition practices as open bidding, discount 
policy assessment, etc.; 
• Transferring some contracting procedures for emergency supplies to the units’ 
commanders with proper budgetary freedom and overall control; 
 
2. LONG TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
• Research on best foreign practices; 
• Research on foreign legislation for paper issuance compatibility; 
• Proposals for changing of the relevant legislation in support of the new 
visions, ideas and improvements; 
• Formal issuance of vision, missions, and goals, their proper empowerment as 
acting law and assignment of relevant responsibilities for management and 
control; 
• Research on NATO practices and their appliance in the Ministry of Defense; 
• Development and implementation of system of incentives towards 
innovations; 
• Specialized education of the key representatives of the procurement system, 
overall personnel policy, and additional incentives; 
 
D. FURTHER RESEARCH TO BE DONE 
 
• This project is intended to be prolonged and developed additionally by other 
Bulgarian students from the perspective of their respective organizations and 
experience. 
• Best practices of acquisition in other military structures and successful 
business organizations; 
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• Investigate the feasibility of using “process innovation” and “business process 
re-engineering” methodologies to optimize the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense 
procurement system; 
• Optimization of workflow in the Ministry of Defense procurement system; 
• Optimization of processes in the Ministry of Defense procurement system; 
• Optimization of the acquisition planning process with best practices for 
requisition and supply chain management; 
• Improving contracting practices; 
• Existing constraints and their influence on the procurement system 
effectiveness; 
• Contract fulfillment activities in the Ministry of Defense procurement system;  
• NATO practices for acquisition; 
• Ways for better budget utilization with the existing legislation base; 
• Development of vision, missions, and goals for the procurement system; 
• Development of system of incentives towards innovations and changes in the 
Ministry of Defense procurement system; 
• Identify a suitable “change model” to facilitate process innovation and cultural 
change within the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense procurement system; 
• Identify specific laws, regulations, and statutes that impede the exercise of 
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